Case Briefs by DePaul College of Law,
DePaul Journal of Health Care Law 
Volume 2 
Issue 2 Winter 1998 Article 7 
November 2015 
Case Briefs 
DePaul College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl 
Recommended Citation 
DePaul College of Law, Case Briefs, 2 DePaul J. Health Care L. 385 (1998) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl/vol2/iss2/7 
This Case Briefs is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Health Care Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more 
information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
ATTORNEYS' FEES
Hospital Lien for Medical Services Not Required to Pay Share of
Attorneys' Fees for Recovery Out of Personal Injury Claim
The Supreme Court of Colorado upheld a lower court's summary
judgment holding that a hospital seeking to enforce a statutory lien for
payment of medical services upon the proceeds of a personal injury
settlement was not required to pay any attorneys' fees incurred in
obtaining that recovery.'
Plaintiff sustained a "slip and fall" injury in his apartment, and
subsequently entered defendant hospital for treatment., Upon admission,
plaintiff agreed to pay all costs of his medical care including any
attorneys' fees resulting from collection efforts.3 Plaintiff incurred costs
of $13,703.97. 4 Plaintiff then pursued a tort claim against the owner of
the apartment complex.' The hospital assigned plaintiff's bill to HHL
Financial Services (HHL) for collection; and HHL filed a lien on behalf
of the hospital for $13,703.97 against any amount plaintiff might recover
from his lawsuit.6
The landlord's liability insurer settled plaintiff s claim by issuing two
checks totaling $80,000.7 A check in the amount of S13,703.97 was
issued jointly to plaintiff, his attorney, and HHL.3 Plaintiff sought to
reduce the hospital lien by a proportionate share of attorneys' fees to
$4,562.16; however, HHL demanded full payment. 9 The remaining
balance was issued to plaintiff and his attorney.' Plaintiff sued seeking
a declaratory judgment regarding the rights of the parties regarding the
$13,703.97 check.' Defendant hospital was granted summaryjudgment. 2
The court ordered plaintiff to pay the lien plus interest, as well as each
defendants attorneys' fees.' 3
'Trevino v. HHL Fin. Servs., 945 P.2d 1345, 1346 (Colo. 1997).
21d. at 1347.3Id.
4Id.
5Md.6Trevino, 945 P.2d at 1346.
7Id.
s1d.
9 d.
'old.
"Trevino, 945 P.2d at 1346.
21d. at 1347.
13Id.
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Plaintiff appealed, arguing the common fund doctrine required
defendants to pay a portion of the attorneys fees incurred in obtaining the
settlement.' 4 The court held the common fund doctrine was inapplicable
to hospital liens, because the hospital was the creditor, and had no rights
of subrogation against the initial tortfeasor.' 5 Accordingly, the court
upheld the judgment requiring plaintiff to pay the full lien. 6 Trevino v.
HHL Fin. Servs., 945 P.2d 1345 (Colo. 1997).
CRIME
Civil Forfeiture and Loss of Not Bases for
Decreased Prison Sentence of Physician
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
reduced sentence of the lower court and remanded for re-sentencing,
holding the lower court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence lower
than sentencing guidelines. 7
Defendant physician pled guilty to conspiring to dispense controlled
substances and to witness tampering.' 8 A lower court imposed a sentence
of seventy months imprisonment, less than the 108 to 135 months
indicated by sentencing guidelines.'9 The lower court justified its
downward departure based upon defendant's loss of professional
privileges and defendant's return of $50,000 of the proceeds of his illegal
activity as part of his plea agreement.2 °
The issue presented on review was whether the lower court had
abused its discretion in departing from the sentencing guidelines.2' The
court held a party's failure to object to the imposition of a sentence did not
22constitute a waiver. The court stated a departure from sentencing
guidelines required determination of what factors made the case atypical,
and then, whether those factors were sufficient to result in a different
4Id.
'
5Id. at 1350.
'"Trevino, 945 P.2d at 1351.
"United States v. Hoffer, 129 F.3d 1196, 1205 (11 th Cir. 1997).
'
8Id. at 1197.
9Id.201d.21id.
22Hoffer, 129 F.3d at 1200.
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sentence.23 The court held a plea agreement not to contest a civil
forfeiture was only relevant to possible monetary sanctions, but had no
bearing on the term of incarceration.- Moreover, such an agreement was
not a basis for imposing a more lenient sentence than allowed by the
sentencing guidelines.25  Additionally, the court held the loss of
professional privileges was not a valid basis for departure from the
sentencing guidelines.26 Therefore, the court vacated defendant's
sentence, and remandated the case for re-sentencing. 27 United States it
Hoffer, 129 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 1997).
DISABILITY
Corporate Downsizing Legitimate Reason for
Releasing HI V-Positive Plaintiff from Employment
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
summary judgment in favor of defendant employer in an employment
discrimination action brought under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).23
Defendant employed plaintiff for approximately three years before
plaintiffs immediate supervisor notified plaintiff of his termination."z
Plaintiffwas diagnosed human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive in
1984, and developed acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) in
1990." Plaintiff submitted health care claims exceeding S225,000 to the
company's medical provider.3 Plaintiff argued his health condition and
high medical costs were the true reasons for termination of his
employment.32 Defendant claimed plaintiffs discharge was the result of
a company plan to downsize supervisory positions.33
2'1d. at 1200.241d.
2'Id. at 1203.
26Id. at 1205.
27Hoffer, 129 F.3d at 1205.
3"Wohler v. Toledo Stamping & Mfg. Co., 125 F.3d 856, 856 (6th Cir. 1997).
29id.
30Id.
31id.
32Id.
33"Vohler, 125 F.3d at 856.
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The court first addressed plaintiffs claim of discriminatory
discharge.34 The court stated to establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory discharge under the ADA, plaintiff was required to show:
(1) he was an individual with a disability within the meaning of the
ADA;
(2) he was qualified to perform the essential functions of his job
with or without reasonable accommodation; and
(3) he had suffered an adverse employment decision because of his
disability.3
5
The court found plaintiff satisfied the first two elements of the three-
pronged test.36
Regarding the third prong, the court held plaintiff failed to carry
his burden of establishing a discriminatory motive by defendant.37 The
court stated plaintiff was required to produce sufficient evidence to allow
a reasonable jury to reject defendant's articulated explanation for the
discharge as a mere pretext for illegal discrimination.38 The court
explained ifplaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination,
the burden of production would have shifted back to defendant to prove
non-discriminatory motives. 39 Following defendant's explanation of
down-sizing, the burden shifted back to plaintiff.4" Although plaintiff
provided some evidence that defendant was not planning a full-scale
"reduction-in-force," he failed to provide sufficient evidence for ajury to
conclude decreasing the number of supervisory positions was not the
reason for his discharge.4'
Finally, the court addressed plaintiff s claim that defendant failed to
provide reasonable accommodation.42 Initially, plaintiff could have had
34Id. at 857.
3Sd.
361d
371d. at 4.
3Wohler, 125 F.3d at 859.
391d.
401d.
411d.
42Id. at 861.
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a right to reasonable accommodation, if he had been discharged because
of his disability.43 However, plaintiff failed to establish that he was
discharged because of his disability and presented no evidence of any
needed accommodation based on his disability.' Accordingly, the court
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant.45 Wohler v. Toledo Stanmpiig & Mfg. Co., 125 F.3d 856 (6th
Cir. 1997).
DISCOVERY
Claim of Mental Anguish Does Not Automatically
Compel Disclosure of Medical Records
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, in a
claim based on mental anguish, held defendants could compel disclosure
of plaintiff s fall medical histories only if plaintiffs placed their mental
condition at issue.46
Plaintiffs, employees of defendant petroleum company, filed a claim
against defendant alleging discrimination based on sex and race.47
Defendant, in response, filed a motion to compel plaintiffs to allow
defendant to evaluate plaintiffs' medical histories, in the event plaintiffs
sought damages for mental anguish However, plaintiffs alleged their
mental conditions were not part of the case; and, thus, defendant should
be denied access to plaintiffs' medical records."
The court considered whether a plaintiffs mental condition was "in
controversy" in a title VII case. 0 The court held "[s]ince the Fifth Circuit
does not require medical testimony or medical records to support a claim
for mental anguish in Title VII or 1981 cases, it is clear that the Fifth
Circuit interprets 1981 and Title VII such that a claim for mental anguish
or emotional harm under those theories does not necessarily put the
43Wohler, 125 F.3d at 861.
" Id.
451d.
46Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, 177 F.R.D. 376 (ED. Tex, 1997),471d. at 378. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.431d. at 379.
501d.
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plaintiffs mental condition in controversy."'" In addition, the court held
the medical records were not relevant to prove mental anguish, and thus
denied defendants motion to compel.52
Finally, the court granted defendant's motion to compel
computations for work related damages, but denied the motion for
computation of compensatory damages based on mental anguish.53 Burrell
v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, 177 F.R.D. 376 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
Employee Did Not Forfeit FMLA Rights by Failing to
Return to Work on Day After His Father's Death
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, denied defendant employer's motion for summary
judgment, holding plaintiff employee did not forfeit rights under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (Act) when he failed to return to work on
the day after his father's death. 4
Plaintiff requested leave under the Act to care for his father, who had
been diagnosed with cancer.5 5 Plaintiffs third request was granted for a
five-week leave of absence.56 After returning to work two weeks after his
father's death, plaintiff was demoted and eventually forced to resign.'
Plaintiff filed suit alleging violation of the Act.58
The main issue the court addressed in responding to defendant's
motion for summary judgment was whether plaintiff forfeited his rights
under the Act. 9 Defendant argued plaintiff's leave of absence expired on
the day his father died, and plaintiff abandoned his rights under the Act by
not returning to work the next day. 60 The court held because defendant
had not informed plaintiff in writing of his rights and obligations under
"Burrell, 177 F.R.D. at 381.52IM.
"Id. at 387.
54Sherry v. Protection, 981 F. Supp. 1134, 1133 (N.D. Il1. 1997).
S6Id"
JI..57M "
"Sherry, 981 F. Supp. at 1134.
7"Id. at 1135.
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the Act, defendant could not rely on provisions of the Act to penalize
plaintiff.6' Additionally, the court denied defendant's argument the Act
was not violated; because plaintiff was eventually granted five weeks of
leave.62 The court explained that defendant's argument was erroneously
premised on the idea the Act could only be violated through a denial of a
valid request for leave of absence.63 The court held any interference by
the employer with any right provided for in the Act constituted a violation
of the Act.64 Accordingly, the court denied defendant's motion for
summary judgment.65 Shery v. Protection, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1133 (N.D.
Ill. 1997).
EMTALA
EMTALA Does Not Authorize Private
Action Against Physicians
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
granted defendant physician's motion for summary judgment against
complaint alleging causes of action under the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).t ' The court retained
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff regarding the state law medical
malpractice claim.67
Plaintiff, a six year-old boy, was injured in a snowball fight. 3 Two
days later defendant physician examined plaintiff, but diagnosed only a
viral illness. 69 Three days after the initial visit, plaintiff returned to the
emergency room with continuing fever." Defendants diagnosed
appendicitis, but found a normal appendix at surgery.7' Five days after the
61Id. at 1136.
6Id. at 1137.
Old.
6Sheny, 981 F. Supp. at 1147.651d. at 1134.
"
3Fisher v. N.Y. Health & Hosp. Corp., 989 F. Supp. 444,446 (E.DN.Y. 1992)67Md. at 450.6 1d. at 446.
691d.
701d.
71Fisher, 989 F. Supp. at 446.
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appendectomy, defendant diagnosed a severe brain abscess.72 In addition
to the brain abscess, plaintiff was diagnosed with bilateral subdural
empyemas and an epidural hematoma. 73 As a result of the subsequent
brain surgery, plaintiff lost part of his skull, which required him to wear
a hard hat for protection.74 Plaintiff also suffered from neurological,
motor, behavioral, and emotional damage as a result of the illness and
surgery.75
Plaintiff claimed under EMTALA defendant failed adequately to
screen plaintiff when he arrived in the emergency room and failed to
stabilize him before discharging him.76 In reaching its decision, the court
noted the rationale behind the passage of EMTALA was in response to the
growing concern hospitals were dumping patients unable to pay, either by
refusing to provide emergency medical treatment, or transferring patients
before their medical conditions were stable.77 The court stated the
language of EMTALA virtually precluded the implication of a private
right of action against individual physicians.78 Congress, the court noted,
chose to provide a private right of action only against hospitals, although
authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to proceed
administratively against both hospitals and physicians. 79 Accordingly, the
court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendant
physician." Fisher v. N.Y Health & Hosp. Coip., 989 F. Supp. 444
(E.D.N. Y 1998).
72Md.
731d.
741d.7SId
"
76Fisher, 989 F. Supp. at 446.
77Id. at 447.78Id. at 448.
79d.
"Fisher, 989 F. Supp. at 450.
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EVIDENCE
Child Victim's Statement Identifying Sexual Abuser was
Admissible Hearsay Under Medical Treatment Exception
The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed a lower court's conviction of
sexual battery. 8 The court held a child victim's statement identifying the
perpetrator to his family medical practitioner was admissible hearsay
under the medical treatment exception, regardless of whether the
perpetrator was a member of the child's immediate household."
Additionally, the court upheld the trial court's finding that the child was
unavailable as a witness for refusing to testify, and that the child's
statements to his physician, mother, and social worker were sufficiently
reliable to be admissible hearsay."
The child victim claimed he was sexually battered by defendant and
told his mother, social worker, and family physician details of the
battery.? The social worker spoke with defendant about the incidentC 5
At trial, the victim refused to testify, and was found unavailable as a
witness.86 Defendant was subsequently convicted of sexual battery.'
The first issue on appeal was whether defendant's actions constituted
sexual battery, because defendant did not penetrate the victim." The court
held the issue of penetration was not an element of the crime.rP The
second issue was whether defendant's statements to the social worker
should have been excluded, because the social worker did not inform
defendant of his Miranda rights.90 The court held the social worker was
not a law enforcement officer capable of arresting defendant, and
defendant was not in custody at the time of the interview.9' Therefore, the
?Hennington v. Mississippi, 702 So. 2d 403, 406 (Miss. 1997).
82d. at 414-15.
83Id. at 412, 417-1S.
IId.
Msld. at 406.
8Hennington, 702 So. 2d at 406-07.
7Id.
sSId. at 407.
s91d. at 40S.
53Id. at 409.
9
'Hennington, 702 So. 2d at 409.
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social worker was not required to give defendant Miranda warnings.9 2
Third, the court considered whether the lower court properly found the
victim unavailable as a witness, because the victim refused to testify.93
The court found the trial judge had not abused his discretion, because he
made every effort to persuade the child to testify.
94
The final issue was whether testimony by the mother, social worker,
and physician was inadmissible hearsay. The physician's testimony,
which included the victim's identification of defendant as the perpetrator,
was admissible under the medical treatment hearsay exception. 95 The
court held in child abuse cases, statements identifying the perpetrator were
sufficient as medical treatment and, thus, reliable if the perpetrator had
regular contact with the victim. 96 The court also found the testimony by
the social worker and the victim's mother satisfied the two part test for
reliability: (1) whether the child declarant's statements were made
spontaneously or without suggestion, and (2) whether the child declarant
was likely to be telling the truth when the statements were made.97 The
court found the statements were spontaneous and truthful, and thus were
admissible hearsay.98 Hennington v. Mississippi, 702 So. 2d 403 (Miss.
1997).
EXPERT WITNESS
Expert Allowed to State Three-week Delay in Diagnosing
Breast Cancer Increased Risk of Harm
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower court's decision
disallowing expert testimony in a negligence action and remanded the case
for a new trial. 99
Patient scheduled an appointment with defendant physician because
of severe pain and physical changes in her breast.100 Patient was seen by
92Id.
93Id.
94 d. at 412.
951d. at 415 (citing Miss. R. EVID. 803(4)).
"
6Hennington, 702 So. 2d at 415.
97Id. at 417-IS.
93ld.
0Smith v. Grab, 705 A.2d 894, 896 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
MId. at 897.
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defendant's physician assistant (P.A.) and was prescribed an antibiotic.'10
One week later, patient returned to defendant's office because her
symptoms had not changed; and again she was seen by the P.A. who
prescribed a stronger antibiotic.'0 2 Three weeks after patient's initial
appointment, the patient returned to defendant and was again seen by the
P.A. 0 3 Patient was given a mammography and abiopsy was scheduled.'W
Patient was then diagnosed with cancer, failed to respond to
chemotherapy, and eventually died.'05
Patient and her husband (plaintiff) commenced an action for
negligence, misrepresentation, and punitive damages against defendant
and P.A!( 6 Plaintiff alleged the P.A. was negligent in failing to diagnose
patient's cancer; and that the defendant physician acted with reckless
disregard for patient's safety when he entrusted patient to the P.A. on all
three occasions.10 7 During discovery, plaintiffs expert cited no sources
for his opinion that the three-week delay in diagnosis of cancer had a
material effect on patient's likelihood of survival. 03 At trial, plaintiff s
expert stated during cross-examination he based his opinions on general
knowledge, rather than any specific material. ' 69 The trial court granted
defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs expert testimony and granted a
compulsory nonsuit." 0 Plaintiff appealed."'
The primary issues on appeal were: whether the court should have
ordered a compulsory nonsuit and whether plaintiff's expert testimony
should have been disallowed."2  The court held plaintiffs expert
testimony should not have been stricken, because the testimony distinctly
conveyed that the three-week delay in diagnosis increased the risk of
hann.' 13 The court also held the trial court erred by not affording plaintiff
101id.
1021d.
103Id.
't'Smith, 705 A.2d at 897.
1051d.
105Id.
107Id.
" Smith, 705 A.2d at 897-98.
'I~d.
12Id. at 898.
1'31d. at 890.
1998] 395
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the benefit of all favorable evidence and reasonable inferences. 14
Accordingly, the court remanded the case for a new trial."' Smith v.
Grab, 705 A.2d 894 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
Res Ipsa Loquitur Inapplicable in Malpractice Cases
When Issues Not a Matter of Common Knowledge
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee held res ipsa loquitur was
inapplicable in a medical malpractice action, because the issues involved
were not within the knowledge of an average layperson; therefore, an
expert witness was required." 6
Plaintiff patient was admitted to the hospital with pneumonia, and
subsequently transferred to an Intensive Care Unit (ICU), where she was
intubated, and placed on an respirator."7 While in the ICU the nursing
staff was responsible for "turning, positioning and restraining her body
and extremities."" 8 When the respirator tube was removed, plaintiff
complained of numbness in her right arm and clumsiness in her right
hand." 9 Plaintiff and her husband subsequently sued the hospital for
medical malpractice under the theory of res ipsa loquitur.120
The Court began its analysis by noting "fries ipsa loquitur is an
evidentiary doctrine which raises an inference 'from the nature of the
circumstances of the occurrence causing the injury, that if due care had
been exercised by the person in charge of the instrumentality,' the injury
would not have occurred." '' 21 The Supreme Court of Tennessee generally
disallowed res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice cases where the
alleged wrong treatment would require a scientific exposition of the
question by expert testimony. 22
"
4Snzith, 705 A.2d at 890.
115Id.
"'Seavers v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Oak Ridge, No. 03A01-9705-CV-00191, 1997 WL
785681, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1997).171d.
"8Id.
119d.
1201d.
121Seavers, 1997 WL 785681, at *2 (citing Johnson v. Ely, 30 Tenn. App. 294 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1947)).
'"Id. (citing Poor Sisters of St. Francis v. Long, 190 Tenn. 434 (Tenn. 1950)).
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In the instant case, the Court held res ipsa loquitur inapplicable
because the action required the introduction of expert testimony. 123
Defendant argued the injury to plaintiff was the result of an unknown
cause and would have occurred even without a deviation in the standard
of care.'24 However, plaintiffs argued the injury was the result of
prolonged pressure.125 The court held res ipsa loquitur did not apply,
because the resolution of those conflicting views required the introduction
of expert testimony.' 26 Accordingly, the trial court's order granting
defendant hospital's summary judgment was upheld.'- 7  Seavers it
Methodist Med. Ctr. of OakRidge, No. 03A01-9705-CV-00191, 1997 WL
785681 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1997).
Res Ipsa Loquitur Can Apply to Medical Malpractice
The Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Seventh Appellate District,
Mahoning County, held expert testimony regarding standard of care was
not required in an action for medical malpractice in which the negligent
act was so apparent as to be within the comprehension of lay persons., 23
Plaintiff patient underwent surgery for the extraction of impacted
wisdom teeth.129 During the surgery, defendant, an oral surgeon, decided
against removing an impacted tooth on the right side of plaintiff s mouth,
because of the difficulty encountered in extracting the other impacted
teeth.'30 Post-operatively, plaintiff suffered pain in his gum from a tooth
fragment left during the surgery. Subsequent removal of the fragment
relieved the pain.'3 '
Plaintiff filed a small claims medical malpractice complaint against
defendant. 32 Plaintiff sought for reimbursement paid for all deductibles
123Id.
124Id.
125Id.
'
26Seavers, 1997 WL 785681, at *2.
127Id.
"Wean v. Fader, No. 95 C.A. 257, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4306, at *3 (Ohio Ct, App.
Sept. 15, 1997).
"Id. at * 1.
130 d
"
"'Id. at *2.
132Id.
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paid the and for costs of removal of the tooth fragment, as well as the
future costs of extraction of the remaining impacted tooth.133 At trial,
plaintiffpresented testimony and evidence supporting his expenditures for
the surgery, the pain caused by the remaining impacted tooth, and the
anticipated expense of extraction of the remaining impacted tooth.'34 At
the conclusion of plaintiffs case in chief, defendant moved for directed
judgment, which the court granted. 135
Plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court failed to consider the
evidence of the tooth fragment left behind after surgery under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur.'36 The appellate court agreed, holding an exception
to the requirement of expert testimony concerning standard of care existed
when the physician's lack of skill was so apparent as to fall within the
comprehension of lay persons. 137 Finding the trial judge possessed the
common knowledge and experience to understand that plaintiff's whole
tooth should have been extracted, the court held the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applied, and vacated the directed verdict. 3 Wean v. Fader, No.
95 C.A. 257, 1997LEXIS Ohio App. 4306 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 15, 1997).
INFORMED CONSENT
Testimony of Expert Witness that Patient Actually
Gave Oral Informed Consent was Reversible Error
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fifth District reversed and
remanded a lower court's judgment in favor of defendant physician
against plaintiff patient's negligence claim.'39 The court held the
testimony of defendant's expert witness, stating plaintiff had given oral
consent to a tubal ligation, was reversible error. 40 Therefore, plaintiff was
not barred from pursuing punitive damages under a claim of battery.141
3 Wean, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4306, at *3.
134Id
135Id at *3-4.
1361d. at *4.
'
3 Id. at *5.
138 Wean, 1997 LEXIS Ohio App. 4306, at *7.
139Grant v. Petroff, 684 N.E.2d 1020, 1021 (I1. App. Ct. 1997).
1401d. at 1026-27.
14lid.
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Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim against the defendant,
alleging she had not given consent to a tubal ligation performed by
defendant. 142 At trial, defendant called an expert witness who had not
personally heard plaintiffs conversations with defendant prior to
surgery. 143 The expert witness concluded, based on the evidence
presented, plaintiff had orally consented to the procedure.'" Therefore,
the expert witness determined defendant comported with the applicable
standard of care.145 At trial, the jury found in favor of defendant. 4 '
The primary issue on appeal was whether the expert testimony
presented by defendant should have been excluded, because the testimony
went beyond the witness area of expertise and irreparably influenced the
jury. 47 The court held the expert witness could have explained defendant
would have comported with the applicable standard of care, ifplaintiffhad
orally consented to the procedure.1 4 However, the expert witness could
not testify plaintiff did in fact consent to the procedure. 49 The testimony
constituted reversible error because the expert witness did not possess
specific knowledge qualifying him to testify as to the patient's veracity,
and thus, his testimony prejudiced the jury.150
The second issue was whether plaintiff was entitled to file a separate
complaint of battery.' The court held the claim of battery was not a
claim of "healing art malpractice," and therefore, plaintiff was not barred
from seeking punitive damages in connection with the battery claim." 2
Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the lower court and
remanded the case for a new trial. 5 3 Grant v. Petrofj, 684 N.E.2d 1020
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
i421d. at 1021.
14Id. at 1021-22.
'"Grant, 684 N.E.2d at 1021-22.
14SId
14'Id. at 1024.
147Id.
14 Id. at 1026.
149Grant, 684 N.E.2d at 1026.
150 d.
51Id
"
'
52Id. at 1027.
153Id.
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INSURANCE
Insurance Company Not Required to Indemnify
Psychiatrist Who had Sexual Relations With Patient
The United States District Court for Massachusetts held an insurance
company, under a policy's undue familiarity exclusion, did not have to
indemnify a psychiatrist who had sexual relations with a patient.- 4 In
August 1995, plaintiff psychiatrist filed a Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment in the New Hampshire Superior Court alleging the defendant
insurance company was required to indemnify him in an underlying tort
action filed by one of his patients.'55
In 1991, plaintiff purchased professional liability insurance from the
American Psychiatric Association.1 6 The underlying tort action filed
against the psychiatrist alleged he had a consensual sexual relationship
with a patient from 1991 to 1993.' 5 He had reported the incident, but his
license to practice medicine was subsequently revoked.'5 Defendant
represented the plaintiff in the above action, but refused to indemnify
plaintiff because of the undue familiarity exclusion. 59 The policy
explicitly stated: "[T]he Programs policies do not provide either coverage,
nor, with the exception of the undue familiarity exclusion, ... a defense,
... for any claim or damages based in whole or in part on a claim of undue
familiarity.' 160 The policy defined undue familiarity as "any physical
touching by a Participating Member of any person, or any other
demonstrated intention or act for the purposes of sexual stimulation."
161
The court noted the policy exclusion for undue familiarity anticipated
problems with the "transference" phenomenon,' 62 in which the patient
reveals her innermost feelings to her psychiatrist. 63 Although essential
for successful therapy, transference leaves the patient emotionally
'
5 Franklin v. Prof. Risk Management Serv., 987 F. Supp. 71, 72 (D. Mass. 1997).
ISSld.
1561d.
157Id.
...Id. at 73.
'
59Franklin, 987 F. Supp. at 73.
'6OId.
161id
162d.
163 Id.
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vulnerable.' 64 Plaintiff took advantage of transference to have sexual
relations with his patient.16' Accordingly, plaintiff s actions fell within the
undue familiarity exclusion of the policy." Finally, the court noted, the
exclusion was prominently displayed in the policy, and plaintiffhad notice
defendant would not indemnify him in such situations.' Therefore, the
court denied the declaratory judgment for plaintiffY2 3 Franklin v.
Professional Risk Management Sev,. 987 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mass. 1997).
Misrepresentations Do Not Invalidate
Temporary Insurance Policy
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered defendant
insurer to pay policy proceeds to beneficiaries under the terms of a
temporary insurance agreement. 169
Plaintiffs sued defendant life insurance company after defendant
refused to pay benefits under the terms of a temporary insurance poliey. "'
Defendant based its claim upon allegations of misrepresentations on
decedent's policy application.' 7' On the application, decedent failed to
disclose he had received treatment for the use of alcohol and depression
within the past three years.'7 After decedent's death, plaintiffs filed a
claim form, in which they indicated decedent had been undergoing
treatment for depression and chronic pain.Y73 Defendant denied liability
as a result of this discrepancy. 7 4 Plaintiffs argued defendant could not
rely on the misrepresentations, because defendant failed to attach a copy
of decedent's application to the temporary insurance agreement as
required by Texas law.175
'"Franldin, 987 F. Supp. at 73.
MR at 74.
LId. at 75.
'67Id. at 76.
11d. at 77.
'
69Riner v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 131 F.3d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 1997).
'
701d. at 532.
171Id.
17id.
17Id.
"74Riner, 131 F.3d at 532.
7Id. at 533.
1998]
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The court concluded defendant was obligated to pay the proceeds of
decedent's policy. 17 6 The court determined the plain language of the
policy indicated intent by defendant to provide temporary coverage during
the period decedent's application was pending.'77 The terms of the policy
required the insurer to provide temporary coverage after the decedent
completed his medical exam. 178 The court further held the decedent's
policy was never conditionally terminated during the period of temporary
coverage. 179
The court also concluded under Texas law, a provision making
truthful answers on insurance policy applications a condition precedent to
temporary life insurance coverage could not be upheld. 80 Moreover, the
statute precluded an insurer from relying upon representations in a life
insurance application unless a copy of the application was attached to, and
made part of, the contract or policy ofinsurance.' Accordingly, the court
reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendant and ordered
payment of benefits. 182 Riner v. Allstate Life Ins., 131 F.3d 530 (5th Cir.
1997).
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Failure to Attach Medical Records to
Plaintiff's Affidavit Fatal Defect
The Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas division, affirmed a trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant physician because
plaintiff patient's affidavits failed to comply with Rule 166a(f) of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.'83 Medical records referred to in the
affidavits were neither attached, nor served with the affidavits.'84
'
76Id. at 540.
'"Id. at 535.
178id.
179Riner, 131 F.3d at 536.
-
80Id. at 537-39.
...Id. at 538.
"Id. at 540.
7'Franklin v. Beiser, No. 05-96-00485-CV, 1998 WL 2855, at *3 (Tex. App. Jan. 7,
1998) (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(f)).
"I4d. at *3.
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Plaintiff sued defendants for negligence in failing to diagnose and
properly treat her breast cancer, and for misrepresentation in denying she
had cancer.185 Plaintiff complained of a lump in her left breast to
defendant, who then ordered amammogram.' E The mammogram showed
no malignancy." 7 Three years later, defendant examined plaintiff again
and ordered another mammogram, after which defendant informed
plaintiff of the possibility of malignancy.'1 Defendant scheduled an
appointment for plaintiff with a defendant surgeon, but plaintiff never
followed up after the first visit. s9 A year later plaintiff had a biopsy done
by another physician.'90 A cancerous mass was found, and plaintiff
underwent surgery.'9
1
In her action against defendants, plaintiff failed to attach the
necessary medical records to the affidavits in her complaint as required by
Rule 166a(f) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 1' Plaintiff argued she
should have been granted leave to amend her affidavits by including the
necessary medical records,' 93 but the court found the trial court acted
within its discretion in denying her leave to amend the defective
affidavits.9 4 The court held the record failed to indicate plaintiff had
requested a continuance to file amended affidavits at the summary
judgment hearing. 195 Lacking those records, the trial court could not
determine the basis of the consultant physician's opinions.' The court
held the absence of records rendered the affidavits conclusory and was,
therefore, a defect of substance, not form. 197 Thus, the grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants was upheld.193 Franklin i% Beise r, No. 05-
96-00485-CV, 1998 VL 2855 (Tex. App. Jan. 7, 1998).
'I5Id. at * 1.
1s51d
"
197 Id.
ISSFranklin, 1998 WL 2855, at *1.
'
6lsd.
'OId.
1911d.
'
921d. at *3.
'
93Franklin, 1998 WL 2855, at *4.
'94Id. at *4.
'9'Id. at *3.
"'Id. at *4.
'97Id. at *5.
"'Franklin, 1998 WL 2855, at *4.
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Standard of Care Requires Physician in Training to
Follow Teaching Physician's Instructions
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the Third Circuit promulgated the
standard of care applicable to a physician training in a fellowship
program.'99 The court held the trainee physician was required to follow
the instruction of the teaching physician and, while under his direct control
and supervision, to perform those tasks directed by the teaching
physician.2"' The court also held the standard mandated the trainee to
question improper procedures.2 ° Once that duty was discharged, the full
responsibility for the procedure rested with the teaching physician.20 1
Plaintiff patient sought recovery of claimed damages caused by the
negligent placement of metal plates during back surgery.203 In 1987,
plaintiff injured his back and subsequently underwent unsuccessful back
surgery. °4 In late 1990, at the suggestion of defendant physician, plaintiff
underwent unsuccessful lumbar fusion surgery, which fused the vertebrae
in the lower portion of the spine, to alleviate pain.20 5 The surgery required
the insertion of metal plates into the spine to stabilize the fusion.20 6 Expert
testimony established placement and alignment of the screws fastening the
metal plates was crucial to the success of the procedure.20 7 Defendant
trainee physician assisted in the insertion of the screws. 3
Following surgery, plaintiff reported his pain was not alleviated.0 9
Additional testing showed a screw on the right side of the spine was
improperly aligned.210 Defendant performed a second surgery on plaintiff
to remove the improperly aligned screw and plate.2 ' Following surgery,
287Hebert v. LaRocca, 704 So. 2d 331, 337 (La. Ct. App. 1997).2001d.
201 d. at 338.2021d. at 337.203Id. at 332.
2
"'Hebert, 704 So. 2d at 332.
20S1d.
206Id
2071d.20
Id
209Hebert, 704 So. 2d at 334.21
°Od.
21 lid.
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plaintiff reported his back pain had subsided greatly.1 2 Placement of the
screw on the right side was the only issue at trial. 13 The trial court held
defendant did not breach the standard of care applicable to him as a trainee
in placement of the screw on the right side.214 Plaintiff appealed.2M5
The court first addressed the standard of care applicable to a
physician in training in a fellowship.21 6 The court, guided by
uncontroverted expert testimony, held a trainee had a duty to follow the
instructions of a teaching physician.2 7 The court further held a trainee
was required to perform those duties assigned by the teaching physician,
while under the direct control of the teaching physician .2 1  The court,
however, noted the standard did not extinguish the trainee's obligation to
question or report improper procedures to the teaching physician 1 9
Proper questioning, the court held, discharged the fellow's duty, and
placed full responsibility on the teaching physician regarding the
questioned procedure.220
The court next addressed whether defendant breached the standard of
care.21 The court held no evidence existed of any situation that required
defendant to notify the teaching physician.tm Accordingly, thejudgment
of the trial court was affirmed.22 Hebert v LaRocca, 704 So. 2d 331 (La.
Ct. App. 1997).
2121d.
213Id.
2
"
4Hebert, 704 So. 2d at 334.
2
'
51d. at 335.2161d. at 337.2171d.
2181d.
2
'Hebert, 704 So. 2d at 336-37.
20 d. at 337.
22'd. at 338.
2" d.
2'Id. at 339.
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MENTAL HEALTH
Patient Denied Due Process When Held Without Probable
Cause Hearing More Than Seven Days After Initial Detention
The Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama held a prior petition was not
required to commit patient to mental hospital, 224 but holding a patient for
more than seven days after initial detention was a denial of patient's due
process.225
Plaintiffs sister petitioned forplaintiffs involuntary commitment.226
The probate court committed plaintiff to the custody of the State
Department of Mental Health, and plaintiff appealed.22 7 First, plaintiff
argued the probate court was required to find a real and present threat
evidenced by an overt act in order to commit him involuntarily.228 The
court held commitment proceedings must meet the requirements of the
Alabama Act (Act),2 which did not require proof of an overt act.2 30
Therefore, the probate court did not err in not requiring an overt act for
involuntary commitment.23'
Second, plaintiff argued his due process rights were denied, because
he was involuntarily committed to the hospital without a prior petition and
judicial determination under the Act.232 However, the court held the
section of the Act setting forth those requirements was inapplicable to
patient's situation, because probable cause existed as to whether plaintiff
was likely to hurt himself, if he was not involuntarily committed
immediately.233 Patient also argued he was denied due process because the
probate court failed to hold a timely preliminary hearing.234 Pursuant to
the applicable provision of the Act, the court held the probate court was
required to hold a probable cause hearing to justify continued detention
224Garrett v. Alabama, 707 So. 2d 273, 274 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
'Id.
226Id.
228Id
7'9Garrett, 707 So. 2d at 274-75 (citing ALA. CODE 22-52-10.4(a)) (1975).
20Id.
231Id
32id. at 274 (citing 1975 Ala. Acts 353).
233Id. at 275 (citing ALA. CODE 22-52-10.4(a) (1975)).
24Garret, 707 So. 2d at 275.
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within seven days of the initial detention of plaintiff." Because the
hearing was held more than seven days after plaintiff s initial detention,
the plaintiff was denied due process. 6 Garrett i. Alabama, 707 So. 2d
273 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
NEGLIGENCE
Lack of Monitoring Not Sufficient to Establish
Nursing Negligence Without Casual Proof
The Court of Appeals of Louisiana for the Fourth Circuit reversed a trial
court's finding of causation between a nursing staff s negligence and
patient's death. z7 The court also stated the trial court did not err in
upholding the fact finder's conclusion when two treatments for patient's
condition were widely recognized.23S
Patient was diagnosed with sickle cell anemia six months after
birth. 39 At age twenty-three, patient was taken to the emergency room of
defendant hospital complaining of shortness of breath and chest pain.4 9
Patient was admitted with a diagnosis of multiple pulmonary infractions
in both lungs.24' Defendant physician recommended a transfusion;
however, the patient initially refused for fear of contracting the human
immunodeficiency virus (HMI).242 The following day, the patient agreed
to the transfusion.243 Twelve hours after receiving the transfusion, the
patient suffered a cardiopulmonary arrest and died within two weeks.2"
Plaintiff, patient's mother, subsequently filed suit.245
The trial court held defendant physician was not liable, although
defendant hospital was found at fault for "nursing negligence."2 ' The trial
235H,/
"1Id.
"Webb v. Tulane Medical Ctr. Hosp., 700 So. 2d 1141, 1149 (La. Ct. App. 1997),238Hd
239d.
2401d.2411d. at 1142.242 Webb, 700 So. 2d at 1142.2431d.
24Id. at 1143.
24Sld.
246Id
"
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court's finding was based upon testimony showing the nursing staff had
inadequately monitored patient between the time of the transfusion and the
cardiopulmonary arrest.2 47 Defendant hospital appealed.241
The first issue before the court was whether a causal connection
existed between the nurse's failure to monitor and patient's respiratory
arrest.249 The court reversed the trial court's finding of causation, agreeing
with defendant hospital's expert witnesses that no amount of monitoring
could have prevented the arrest.25 0 The court then considered plaintiff's
appeal of the trial court's dismissal of the claim against defendant
physician.25' Plaintiff argued defendant physician's diagnosis of
pulmonary infarct, rather than acute chest syndrome, resulted in a simple
transfusion rather than a partial exchange transfusion.' However, the
court agreed with the trial court's finding that a simple transfusion was an
acceptable treatment for either pulmonary infarct or acute chest syndrome,
and plaintiffs claim against defendant physician was properly
dismissed.253 Webb v. Tulane Med. Ctr. Hosp., 700 So. 2d 1141 (La. Ct.
App. 1997).
ORGAN DONATION
Medical Examiner Not Protected By Immunity Where
Express Denial of Permission to Remove Organ Tissues
The Court of Appeals of Texas held neither statutory, nor official,
immunity protected a medical examiner, who removed the comeas during
an autopsy, after the deceased's father expressly denied consent to the
removal of the tissues.5 4
247Webb, 700 So. 2d at 1143.
2431d. at 1142.
2491d. at 1144.
'
01d. at 1145.
2'Id.
2 2 Webb, 700 So. 2d at 1145.
2"Id. at 1149.
2 4Komdorfferv. Baker, No. 01-96-00062-CV, 1997 WL797601, at *5 (Tex. App.
Houston [1st. Dist.]Dec. 18, 1997).
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A gunshot wound inflicted during an altercation with the police killed
the decedent. 255 Texas law required an autopsy to be performed.2M Texas
law also permitted the medical examiner to remove and donate the corneas
without family consent in certain situations.25 The plaintiff; decedent's
father, called the medical examiner's office and spoke with one of the part-
time investigators regarding the autopsyY Plaintiff expressly objected to
the removal of any body parts or tissues.25 9 However, the investigator
stated plaintiff did not object to the removal of the comeas.L ° Thus, the
corneas were removed from the decedent's eyes later that evening. 2 z1
Plaintiff sued defendant medical examiner for negligence and negligence
per se for allowing the removal of the comeas. 2 Defendant moved for
summary judgment, but the trial court denied the motion. "3 Defendant
then appealed the trial court's decision.26
Defendant first argued immunity from liability under the Texas
Health & Safety Code.265 Defendant claimed he "determined the removal
of the decedent's comeal tissue would not interfere with subsequent
investigations or autopsy, would not alter the decedent's post-mortem
facial appearance, and that he was aware of no objections to the removal
of the decedent's corneal tissue. ,266 However, plaintiffpresented evidence
he instructed the medical examiner's assistant not to perform anything but
the standard autopsy.267 The court held plaintiff presented sufficient
evidence to support his claim he had not consented to the removal of the
comeas, and thus, denied summary judgment.2' The court also held
defendant should have known prior to the removal of the comeas that
plaintiff had objected. 69
2'5Id. at *l.
2Id.
2'7Id.
2'9Korndorffer, 1997 WL 797601, at *1.
263Id.
261id.
262Id.
263Id.
'6Id. at *2.265Korndorffer, 1997 WL 797601, at *2 (citing TEx. HFALTi & SAFE"TY CODE A,,
693.012).
'z6Id. at *3.267Id.
2631d. at *4.2691d.
1998] 409
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
Defendant also raised the defense of official immunity arguing
"government employees are entitled to official immunity from suits arising
from the performance of their discretionary duties, performed in good
faith, as long as they are acting within the scope of their authority. '270 The
court held defendant lacked discretionary duty in removing the corneas.2z '
Once the father objected to the removal of the corneas, defendant could
not lawfully remove the corneas. 272 Therefore, defendant lacked qualified
immunity; thus the court denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment.2 73 Korndorffer v. Baker, No. 01-96-00062-CV, 1997 tL
797601 (Tex. App. Houston [ist Dist.] Dec. 18, 1997).
REIMBURSEMENT
Reimbursement Denied For Unauthorized
Medical Treatment of Veteran
The United States Court of Veterans Appeals affirmed the Board of
Veterans Appeals' decision denying reimbursement costs for the
unauthorized private hospitalization and nursing home care for plaintiff s
husband.27
4
Plaintiffs veteran husband received unauthorized private hospital
care on numerous occasions before his death.27 After his death, plaintiff
filed a claim for reimbursement of his medical expenses.276 Plaintiffs
reimbursement claim was denied because her husband's medical care had
not been previously authorized, and the criteria for reimbursement for
unauthorized care had not been met pursuant to the applicable statute.277
The court held plaintiff was not entitled to reimbursement. 278 The
court noted non-veteran facilities were authorized to provide hospital care
or medical services when military facilities were not capable of providing
270Korndorffer, 1997 WL 797601, at *5.271Id. at *5.2721d. at *4.
211d. at *5.
'
87Malone v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 539, 544 (Vet. App. 1997).
2"Id. at 540.
276Id
2'Id. (citing 38 U.S.C. 1703(a)(1991 & Supp. 1997)).
211d. at 540.
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similar services. 279 However, neither the statute nor the regulations
provided for reimbursement to veterans who paid for such authorized
services themselves.2 ' Furthermore, plaintiffs husband was not eligible
for contracted hospital services at a non-veteran facility under the statute,
because he was not treated at a veteran's hospital for service connected
injuries.2 1  Moreover, the plaintiff did not meet the reimbursement
requirements under the statute.282 The Court also noted, if its decision
resulted in a gap in the statutory scheme, the gap should be filled by the
legislature rather than by the courts.28 3 Malone . Gobet; 10 J et. App. 539
(Vet. App. 1997).
REPRODUCTIVE ISSUES
Quasi-Public Hospital's Anti-Abortion
Policy Violated State Constitution
The Supreme Court ofAlaska affirmed a lower court's summary judgment
and permanent injunction against hospital.3 4 The court held the quasi-
public hospital's ban on elective abortions violated the state constitutional
right to privacy.2 5 Further, the court held a state statute declaring
hospitals did not have to participate in abortion was unconstitutional as
applied to quasi-public institutions.3
A non-profit, non-religiously affiliated membership corporation
organized for the public interest owned the hospital.2z ' The hospital was
the only facility in the Matanuska-Susitna (Mat-Su) Valley, and the
hospital received state funds for expansion.22 In 1992, the Hospital
Operating Board enacted a new policy prohibiting elective abortions
unless:
279Malone, 10 Vet. App. at 540 (citing 38 U.S.C. 7 (1991 & Supp. 1997)).
20Id.
2' Id. at 544 (citing 3S U.S.C. 1703 (1991 & Supp. 1997)).
2'Id. at 546 (citing 38 U.S.C. 1728 (1991 & Supp. 1997) .
201d. at 547.3197Valley Hosp. Assn. v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P,2d 963,965 (Alasha 1997)
2SId.
28M.287Id.
288id.
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(1) the fetus had a condition incompatible with life,
(2) the mother's life was threatened, or
(3) the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest.289
Subsequently, plaintiff, the Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, filed suit
against the hospital seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.29
The court held the right to abortion was a fundamental right
encompassed in the Alaska Constitution, and the right could only be
constrained by a compelling state interest using the least restrictive
means.29 1 The court deemed the hospital a quasi-public institution because
the hospital was the only facility serving the community, and the hospital
received government funds for construction, land, and operating costs.
292
The hospital did not demonstrate a compelling state interest for refusing
elective abortions and thus, was subject to state constitutional constraints
providing for abortion rights.293
The court also examined an Alaska statute which stated hospitals
could refuse to offer abortions for moral reasons.294 The court found the
statute unconstitutional as applied to quasi-public institutions because the
statute provided a basis for the hospital to deny the express privacy right
to abortion under the state constitution. 295 Therefore, the court affirmed
the lower court's summary judgment and permanent injunction against the
hospital.2 96 Valley Hosp. Ass' v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d
963 (Alaska 1997).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Statute of Limitations Runs When Patient Should
Have Been Aware of Misdiagnosis
2
" Valley Hosp. Assn., 948 P.2d at 965.
29
'Id
"
29 Id. at 969.
2921d. at 970.2931d. at 971.
294 Valley Hosp. Assn., 948 P.2d at 971-72.
2951d. at 972.
296Id. at 973.
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The Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the Third Circuit affirmed a trial
court's ruling that plaintiff had sufficient facts and knowledge for
prescription, that is, the statute of limitations, to apply.2 7 The court held
Louisiana law did not require patients to be informed by attorneys that a
medical malpractice action existed before prescription could run.293
In April 1992, defendant physician diagnosed a lump in plaintiff
patient's breast at the edge of her breast implant.2 "9 When plaintiff
informed her obstetrician/gynecologist (OBIGYN) of the lump in August
1992, her OB/GYN ordered an immediate biopsy, which showed the lump
was malignant.3 ' Although plaintiff underwent surgery for the
malignancy in September 1992, she did not file her request for the
convening of a medical review panel until April 29, 1994.' At the
hearing on defendant physician's exception ofprescription, held February
24, 1997, plaintiff admitted she considered filing a complaint against
defendant as early as September 1992.302 Plaintiff's explained she did not
file the suit because she did not realize she had a case until January 1994,
when she received a brochure from New York attorneys involved in breast
implant litigation.3°3
In evaluating whether plaintiff had knowledge of possible
malpractice, the court held each case must be decided on its own facts 
3 N
Plaintiff's educational background, intelligence, and past experience with
medical procedures could be introduced.305 The court further held the law
did not require a patient be informed, by either an attorney or a physician,
of possible malpractice before prescription could apply.t 'Y Generally, the
court held, the party urging prescription had the burden of proof, unless
prescription was evident from the face of the pleadings.397 In that case,
4
'Parker v. Dr. X, 704 So. 2d 373, 376 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
9MId.291d. at 374.
30-.Id.
3011d.
302Parker, 704 So. 2d at 376.
303Id
3c"4Id. at 375.
"0d. (citing Lambert v. Metrailer, 485 So. 2d 69 (La. Ct. App. 196)).
...Id. (citing Harlan v. Roberts, 565 So. 2d 482,486 (La. Ct. App. 1990)),
-'7Parker, 704 So. 2d at 375.
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plaintiff would have the burden of showing an action had not been
prescribed. °8
Finding the pleadings facially prescribed plaintiffs case, the court
held the burden of proof fell on plaintiff to establish the action had not
prescribed.30 9 The court held plaintiff was either aware or should have
been aware of the facts upon which her action was based at the time of her
surgery.310 Furthermore, the court held plaintiffs contemplation of a
lawsuit in September 1992 indicated she had sufficient facts and
knowledge for prescription to apply.31' Parker v. Dr. X, 704 So. 2d 373
(La. Ct. App. 1997).
Medical Malpractice Action for a Minor To Be Filed
Within Two Years After Eighteenth Birthday
The Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri affirmed a trial
court's dismissal of a medical malpractice action against a physician and
hospital, because the plaintiff filed his claim more than two years after his
eighteenth birthday.312
Plaintiff patient sued defendant hospital and physician alleging
medical malpractice.313 Plaintiff had injured his left leg in a bicycle-
automobile accident when he was twelve years old.314 After the accident,
defendant treated plaintiff, but failed to order radiographs of plaintiff s left
femoral head or hip.315 Accordingly, defendant failed to diagnose serious
damage in that area of plaintiffs body leading to permanent impairment
of plaintiffs left hip, requiring early hip replacement.316 Plaintiff sued
defendant physician and defendant hospital alleging medical
malpractice.3 17
30Sld
"3091d.
3 l°Id
3 1lid.
312Hodges v. Southeast Mo. Hosp. Ass'n, 963 S.W.2d 354, 355 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).3131d.
314Id
3 1 Sd.
3 16Id.
317Hodges, 963 S.W.2d at 355.
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Plaintiffvoluntarily agreed to dismissal of the action, but then refiled
when he was twenty-one years old.318 The trial court held the statute of
limitations barred plaintiffs claim and accordingly, dismissed it.3'9
Plaintiff appealed arguing the trial court erred in its application of the
applicable Missouri statute.320 Plaintiff contended the statute in question,
which established the statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions,
unconstitutionally denied minors access to the courts. 2' Plaintiff further
argued Strahler v. St. Lukes Hospital32 2 permitted a plaintiff to file an
action in medical malpractice after age twenty-one, if the negligent act
occurred when the plaintiff was a minor.3
The court distinguished Strahler from the instant case by noting the
Strahler decision invalidated statutory language giving minors negligently
injured under the age of ten standing to sue until age twelve.2 4 By
removing the exception for minors under the age of ten, the Strahler
decision left no language in the statute indicating minors were to be
treated differently with regard to the statute of limitations than adults. -25
The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's action.32 6 Hodges v.
Southeast Mo. Hosp. Assn., 963 S. W.2d 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
Liability Claim for AIDS Accrued When Plaintiff
Learned of HIV-Positive Status
The Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed summaryjudgment in favor
of defendant, ablood factor concentrate manufacturer, and held the statute
of limitations for plaintiff s claim had expired. 3 7 The court determined
plaintiff's claim accrued when plaintiff learned he had contracted the
3181d.
391d.
3201d. at 356 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.05 (1994)).
321Id.
3"Hodges, 963 S.V.2d at 355 (citing Strahler v. St. Lukes Hosp., 706 SW.2d 7 (Mo
bane 1986)).3
' ad. at 356 (citing Strahler v. St. Lukes Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo, 1986) (en bane).3241d. at 358.
3251d.
32Hodges,. 963 S.W.2d at 360.
3'27Berrios v. Miles, Inc., 574 N.W.2d 677, 677 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
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human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), not when plaintiff began to exhibit
symptoms of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). 328
Plaintiff was given a blood concentrate product manufactured by
defendant.329 In 1985, plaintiff, age at fourteen, was informed he had
contracted HIV, and defendant's product was the likely source of the
infection.330 Plaintiffbegan to experience symptoms of AIDS in 1992, but
did not file a lawsuit until 1994. 33'
The court first looked at the time of plaintiffs injury.332 Injury was
determined to be at the point plaintiff discovered he was HIV-positive,
which was the earliest point plaintiff was made aware of a potential cause
of action.333 The court dismissed plaintiffs contention his damages were
speculative at the time he discovered he was HIV-positive, since as early
as 1987, there was general awareness that all individuals infected with
HIV would eventually develop AIDS.3
The court then examined the applicable statute of limitations to
determine the time frame in which plaintiff was able to file suit. 335 The
limitations period for products liability actions was three years and thus,
the limitations had expired in 1988.336 Because plaintiff was a minor at the
time the claim accrued, he would have been able to file a claim until
December 12, 1989, one year after his eighteenth birthday.337 The court
held plaintiffs suit was time-barred because he did not file suit until
1994.338 Berrios v. Miles, 574 N. W.2d 677 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
Mentally Incompetent Minor Subject to Tolling Provision
for Legal Disabilities Other than Minority
32Sld.
329Id
3301d.
331id.
"'Berrios, 574 N.W.2d at 678.
333Id
334Id
33S1d.
336Id
3"Berrios, 574 N.W.2d at 679.
338id.
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The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the lower court's judgment
remanding a negligence claim to the trial court.339 The court held because
plaintiff was suffering from the dual legal disabilities of mental
incompetency and minority, he was subject to the tolling provision for
legal disabilities other than minority, and not the eight-year repose period
for minors. 3
40
Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against defendant
physicians and hospital seeking damages for permanent injuries sustained
at birth.34' Defendants moved to dismiss the action, because the suit was
filed more than sixteen years after the alleged malpractice occurred and
thus, barred by the eight-year statute of repose for minors. 42
The court examined at the section of the Code of Civil Procedure
applicable to plaintiff's claims of medical malpractice. 43 The court found
the plain language of the statute, which indicated the tolling provision
allowed for the statute of limitations to run until the disability was
removed, included minors who suffered from additional legal
disabilities.3" The court noted mental incompetents were favored persons
in the eyes of the law, and courts have a special duty to protect their
rights.3 45 The court dismissed defendants' argument the appropriate
statute of limitations was the eight-year repose period on all claims
brought by minors, regardless of whether the minor suffered from another
legal disability.3 46 Therefore, plaintiff s suit was not time-barred.34 Bnrso
v. Alexian Brothers Hosp., 687 N.E.2d 1014 (171. 1997).
474Bruso v. Alexian Brothers Hosp., 687 N.E.2d 1014, 1020 (111. 1997).
34d.
34 id. at 1015.
m3Id. at 1015-16 (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-212(b), (c) (%Vest 1994)).
3 4Bruso, 687 N.E.2d at 1016-17 (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5113-212(b), (c) (West
1994)).
34Id. at 1017.
3"Id. at 1020.
3 7 Id. at 1020-21.
1998] 417
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
TORTS
Feres Doctrine Applied to Bar Medical Malpractice Suit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision applying the Feres doctrine to bar plaintiff's claim
against the United States.348 The court held the Feres doctrine applied to
medical malpractice suits arising from military injuries.349
After breaking her hand while on active duty with the Indiana
National Guard, plaintiff brought a claim for medical malpractice."'
Plaintiff alleged her injuries were aggravated from the negligent medical
care she received at the military hospital.35' Plaintiffs hand had to be
reset on several occasions, and she was eventually required to undergo
surgery to correct a nonunion of the original fracture site.352 The
Department of Veteran Affairs denied the claim and plaintiff appealed.353
The district court held her suit was jurisdictionally barred by the Feres
doctrine.Y According to the Feres doctrine, the Federal Tort Claims
Act3 55 protects government immunity for injuries arising out of activities
relating to injured individual's military service. 356
The issue before the appellate court was whether plaintiff s injuries
arose out of or occurred during the course of her military service.357 The
appellate court held plaintiffs suit was barred because the original injury
occurred while she was on active duty and because plaintiff was involved
in a continuing course of treatment for her injury at the military hospital.358
Therefore, the appellate court followed prior Supreme Court cases
applying the Feres doctrine to bar suits for medical malpractice arising out
348Selbe v. United States, 130 F.3d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1997).
3491d.
'"Id. at 1266.35 1Id.3521d
"3S3Selbe, 130 F.3d at 1268.
3541d.
3551d. at 1265 (citing 28 U.S.C. 1346(6) and 2675).
3S61d. at 1265 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)).357 d.3SSSelbe, 130 F.3d at 1265.
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of military injuries.359 Selbe '. United States, 130 F.3d 1265 (7th Cir.
1997).
Plaintiff Required to Present Expert Testimony Regarding
Standard of Care Despite Intentional Tort Claim
The Court of Appeals of Idaho held plaintiff bringing action for damages
against defendant physician for injury or death could not avoid the
requirement of establishing through expert testimony the physician's
failure to meet the standard of care by claiming an action based upon an
intentional tort.360
Plaintiffs wife entered the hospital with chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, and died five days later.36' Plaintiff alleged his wife's
physicians breached their duty by withholding life support. - 2 Defendants
moved for summaryjudgment.363 Plaintiffresponded to their motion, but
only submitted affidavits from himself and his daughter, an emergency
medical technician.364 After hearing arguments, the district court held
plaintiff bore the burden of establishing by expert testimony the
defendant's breach of the standard of care. 5 Finding plaintiff failed to
establish a breach of standard of care, the court granted the motion for
summary judgment in favor of defendants. -L
On appeal, plaintiff argued because he based his cause of action on
intentional infliction of emotional distress, rather than negligence; he was
not required to establish a breach of standard of care. ' 7 Defendants
argued plaintiff's pleadings contained language consistent with an action
based in negligence.3 68 The court agreed, holding plaintiff was required
to present expert testimony regarding the applicable standard of care. -9
359 d.
...Litz v. Robinson, 955 P.2d 113, 116 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997).
'
6
'Id. at 113-14.
3621d. at 114.
' 'Id
"
-"Id.
36 Litz, 955 P.2d at 114.
36Id.
3'3Id.
'"9. at 115.
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As plaintiff had failed to offer expert testimony, the court upheld the grant
of summary judgment in favor of defendants. 37" Litz v. Robinson, 955
P.2d 113 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997).
WORKERS COMPENSATION
Causal Connection Between Plaintiffs Depression and Work-
Related Accident Entitles Her to Workers Compensation
The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the Workers Compensation
Commission's decision to award partial disability benefits to claimant
until claimant no longer suffered from a work-related injury or
condition.37'
Claimant suffered a work-related back injury, and returned to work
three months later.371 Upon her return, claimant had a dispute with her
supervisor about the amount of time she would be able to work.37 3
Claimant subsequently became severely depressed and was eventually
admitted to a psychiatric facility.3 74 Claimant eventually returned to work
but was only able to work reduced hours because of her depression.375 The
Workers Compensation Commission awarded partial disability benefits
and employer appealed.376
The issue on appeal was whether credible evidence supported the
award of partial disability benefits.377 Relying on the commission's
finding that claimant's depression was causally related to her work related
injury, the court held claimant was entitled to partial disability benefits
until claimant no longer suffered from ajob-related injury or condition.
Mary Washington Hosp. v. Harrison, 493 S.E.2d 693 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
37 Litz, 955 P.2d at 116.37 1Mary Washington Hosp. v. Harrison, 493 S.E.2d 693, 694 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).372Id.373Id.
374Id. at 694-95.375Id. at 695.376Mary Washington Hosp., 493 S.E.2d at 695.37Id
3h1id. at 696.
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